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I.   INTRODUCTION
No matter how draconian, gun control laws are weakly enforced (at least in the
United States) and seldom of any significant effect in reducing crime.1  The kind of
citizen who will comply with a gun law is the opposite of the person who will use a gun
to facilitate his or her crimes.  The problem of weak enforcement is highlighted by a
candid interview with the author of the District of Columbia’s 1968 gun registration
scheme while the District’s 1975-76 gun ban was under consideration:  
The problem, [Hechinger] said, is the failure of the mayor and police department
to enforce the [current] regulations. “Not only didn’t they enforce them; the[y] didn’t
even publicize them,” he said.
If the city’s executives were lax on gun laws, its judiciary was hardly better. Of
184 persons prosecuted and convicted for first-time gun possession in the first six
months of last year, only 14 received jail sentences.
One judge, according to a report to the House District Committee last week,
awarded a jail sentence to only one of 73 gun offenders convicted in his court.2
This led a prominent newspaper commentator to remark that “[i]t might be a good idea
to try enforcing the old gun law before rushing to enact new ones.”3  
Even as they were voting for the new gun ban, D.C. politicians were admitting that
it was a mere placebo.  City Councilman Marion Berry (later to become Mayor)
admitted: “Massachusetts has stringent gun control and armed robbery has not
decreased but increased. The TV creates far more violence than any gun lobbyist. I,
too, am going to vote for this bill [sic] that I want it understood that I realize it’s not
adequate . . . .”4  Councilman Jerry Moore made the same point saying that he had “no
illusions about this law—it won’t take guns off the streets.”5
So the question becomes, “Why enact them?”
Is there a hidden political dynamic?  But “hidden” means hard to find.  So maybe
we should look for the answer in a related jurisdiction that keeps more extensive
records of its government’s deliberations.  
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II.   A LOOK AT BRITAIN
 In 1870, there were no laws regulating the possession, purchase, and peaceful
carrying of firearms in Britain.6  Anyone, child or adult, could buy a pistol, load it, and
carry it under his coat with no legal consequences.  As late as 1920, the law presented
no obstacle to an adult without a criminal history purchasing a rifle, shotgun, or pistol,
and carrying it concealed upon his person.7  Yet today, Britain has some of the most
restrictive gun control laws in the world.8
The Firearms Act of 19209 was a watershed of British firearms control.  From its
passage, the ownership of firearms ceased to be a right of Englishmen, and instead
became a privilege—one increasingly restricted over the intervening 75 years.10  Under
the direction of the Home Office, police discretion in licensing throughout Britain has
made ownership of firearms an increasingly rare event.11  Why was the Firearms Act
of 1920 passed?
There are several possible causes for the Firearms Act of 1920, all of which are
plausible explanations: concern about criminal misuse of firearms; gun running to
Ireland; increased political violence in the pre-World War I period.  Yet, examination
of the Cabinet papers declassified in 1970,12 and Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones’s
diaries,13 shows that all of these other concerns were insignificant compared to the fear
of Bolshevik revolution.
III.   A BRITON’S TRADITIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE ARMS
First of all, it is necessary to clearly understand that the absence of firearms
controls was not because low crime rates made them unnecessary, but because Britons
considered the possession of arms to be a right.  The English Bill of Rights (1689)
asserted by its passage that the people were “vindicating and asserting their ancient
rights and liberties,” including the seventh article: “That the subjects which are
protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as
allowed by law.”14
This guarantee reflected the widespread fear of absolutism and Jacobite royal
tyranny.  Some have defended this claim of “ancient rights and liberties” with great
skill.15  The most scholarly examination, however, shows that in the aftermath of the
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English Civil War, political theorists imagined what had formerly been a duty to bear
arms in defense of the realm and public order into a “true, ancient, and indubitable”
right.16
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) (Commentaries) also
asserted this right:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that
of having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as
are allowed by law. . . .  [I]t is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of
the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.17
Both the English Bill of Rights and Blackstone’s remarks show that significant
restrictions (“suitable to their condition and degree”) hemmed in this right.  Nonethe-
less, both still defined this as a right to arms.
Jacobite absolutism seemed an adequate reason in 1689 to enshrine the Protestant
Englishman’s right to arms, especially since the English Bill of Rights limited only the
power of the sovereign, not of Parliament.  But, as Joyce Malcolm observes, “It is easy
to defend popular liberties when ‘things remain in their legal and settled course,’ but
far more difficult when anarchy, not absolutism, threatens.”18
London’s Gordon Riots of 1780 were one of those times when anarchy seemed to
be a real risk.19  In the aftermath of those riots, Members of Parliament faulted the
government for actions it took and actions it did not take.20  In particular, the Duke of
Richmond objected to
the conduct of the Commander in Chief of the army, for the letters he sent to Colonel
Twisleton, who commanded the military force in the City, ordering him to disarm the
citizens, who had taken up arms, and formed themselves into associations, for the
defence of their lives and properties.  These letters he considered as a violation of the
constitutional right of Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for their own
defence.21 
Lord Amherst agreed that the disarming order was intended only for the rioters, “but
no passage in his letter could be construed to mean, that the arms should be taken away
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from the associated citizens, who had very properly armed themselves for the defence
of their lives and property.”22
The duality of the contemporary usage was shown by a contemporaneous
pronouncement by the Recorder of London—the city’s chief legal officer—when asked
if the right to have arms in the English Declaration of Rights protected armed
defensive groups as well as armed individuals. 
The right of his majesty's Protestant subjects, to have arms for their own defence, and
to use them for lawful purposes, is most clear and undeniable.  It seems, indeed, to be
considered, by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only as a right, but as a duty; for
all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at all
times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution of the laws and
the preservation of the public peace.  And that right, which every Protestant most
unquestionably possesses, individually, may, and in many cases must, be exercised
collectively, is likewise a point which I conceive to be most clearly established by the
authority of judicial decisions and ancient acts of parliament, as well as by reason and
common sense.23
The common law was in agreement.  In his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries
that appeared in the 1790s, Edward Christian described the rights of Englishmen (the
rights which every American colonist had been promised) in these terms: “everyone
is at liberty to keep or carry a gun, if he does not use it for the [unlawful] destruction
of game.”24  This right was separate from militia duties.25
The agricultural slump after the Napoleonic Wars three decades later led to
widespread unrest, riots, and assemblies calling for Parliamentary reform.26  After the
so-called Peterloo massacre, the conflict between the right to bear arms and fear of
working class unrest led the English courts to distinguish between the differing reasons
for bearing arms.27  The courts concluded that there was an individual right to bear
arms for self-defense, but there was no right to carry arms to a public meeting if the
number of arms “so carried are calculated to produce terror and alarm.”28
More ominously, the Seizure of Arms Act, one of the “Six Acts” passed in 1819
by Parliament in response to the unrest, provided for constables to search for and seize
arms on the testimony of a single person that they were being kept for a purpose
“dangerous to the public peace.”29  The Seizure of Arms Act was limited to the
industrial areas where riots took place, and with a two-year expiration period.30
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Nonetheless, in the House of Lords, Earl Grey called it a violation of the rights of
Englishmen “not only for defence against the assassin or the midnight robber, but to
enforce his constitutional right of resistance to oppression, if deprived of the benefit
of the laws.”31  In the Commons, M.P. Bennet argued the same point: “[T]he distinctive
difference between a freeman and a slave was a right to possess arms, not so much . . .
for the purpose of defending his property as his liberty.  Neither could he do, if
deprived of those arms, in the hour of danger.”32
Even Lord Castlereagh, then foreign secretary, admitted that “it was an infringe-
ment upon the rights and duties of the people, and that it could only be defended upon
the necessity of the case.  But that necessity now existed . . . .”33  Similar measures had
been applied to civil war in Scotland and Ireland in the past, Castlereagh observed.
M.P. Brougham pointed out that in both cases; however, these civil wars had involved
foreign assistance—unlike this case.34
Yet, even the Seizure of Arms Act had made distinctions based on the function of
different classes of arms that were to be seized.  “Any pike, pike head or spear in the
possession of any person or in any house or place” was subject to confiscation, but
“any dirk, dagger, pistol or gun or other weapon” was to be seized only if they were
possessed for “any purpose dangerous to the public peace.”35  This distinguished
between weapons perceived as offensive and defensive, for even the supporters of the
Seizure of Arms Act generally accepted the right to possess arms for self-defense.36
The Seizure of Arms Act expired after two years, and Parliament passed no similar
restrictions between 1819 and the end of the nineteenth century, even during the
turbulence of the Chartist movement37 and repeated assassination attempts on Queen
Victoria with pistols.38  Greenwood suggests that by the time of the Chartists, the
professionalization of the police forces meant that the government relied less upon paid
informants as a source of information on subversives.39  Paid informants were prone
to exaggeration because they perceived that their value to the police was dependent on
the seriousness of the information they provided.40  In addition, information provided
by firearms manufacturers persuaded the Home Secretary that the Chartists were not
arming for revolution, despite alarming newspaper accounts to the contrary.41
So relaxed were British firearms controls throughout the remainder of the
nineteenth century that Parliament passed only one measure regulating the carrying or
possession of firearms: the Gun Licences Act of 1870.42  This measure required a
license to carry a firearm (concealed or openly) outside one’s home.  Greenwood
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asserts that “[i]t was merely an Excise Act and required, with certain exceptions, that
any person carrying or using a gun elsewhere than in or within the curtilege of a
dwelling-house should pay a revenue fee of ten shillings.  The licence was available,
without question, at any Post Office.”43
Other sources suggest that some Members of Parliament had other motivations
besides revenue.  During debate concerning amendments to the Act in 1879, in which
Sir Alexander Gordon argued that the measure had created great difficulties for
farmers, who had previously been allowed to possess firearms for frightening away
birds without needing to obtain a game license, Gordon asserted that the Secretary to
the Treasury “said he did not believe the Bill would in any way promote the
preservation of game, and he had supported it on the sole ground that it would be
useful in securing the registering of arms in this country.”44  Gordon further asserts that
the then Chancellor of the Exchequer’s stated purpose was “to discourage the lower
classes from habitually carrying deadly weapons.”45  However, because the act applied
only to the carrying of guns, it did not even serve the stated purpose of keeping guns
out of the hands of the dangerous classes.46
Other Members of Parliament during those debates acknowledged that the Gun
Licences Act of 1870 had caused considerable upset among farmers, and did not even
accomplish the questionable goal of registering guns primarily intended for use in
Ireland, “where the Government were anxious to find out who were in possession of
guns.”  Therefore, if there was not sufficient support to repeal the law, it should be
reformed.47 
Parliament considered several firearms control bills between the Gun Licences Act
of 1870 and the end of the century.  These bills either sought to enhance penalties for
armed burglary, or to require a hunting or carrying license as a condition of purchasing
a handgun.48  The combination of substantial opposition to restrictions on arms and a
perception that the bills were superfluous caused all to die on the first or second
reading in the House of Commons.49  
Most of these proposals were aimed at criminal misuse.50  Yet there were other
motives present as well.  When the Marquess of Carmarthen introduced the Second
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59. H.G. WELLS, THE INVISIBLE MAN: A GROTESQUE ROMANCE 131 (1897).  This distinction,
recognized in The Invisible Man, remains in effect today in Britain.  One recent work on British weapons
law asserts that under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, a deadly weapon cannot be carried or used
to injure other people.  HILL, supra note 15, at 57. However, while a firearm used with the intent of hitting
an intruder is a violation of the law, a firearm can lawfully be used with the intent of frightening an
attacker, even if the warning shot accidentally hits the attacker.  Id. at 60.
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Reading of his 1895 Pistols Bill in the Commons, he “complained that he would have
preferred a Bill which provided that no one but a soldier, sailor or policeman should
have a pistol at all, because they were a source of danger to their possessors . . . .”51
The Pistols Act of 1903, in contrast to the similar, somewhat more restrictive
measures introduced in 1893 and 1895, passed with little debate.52  Greenwood
suggests that because proof of being a householder was one of the three methods by
which a buyer qualified to buy a handgun, this measure was not regarded as an attack
on the right to bear arms.53  Since the stated goal was to prevent children from buying
handguns from retailers, and it accomplished that and nothing else, the Pistols Act was
uncontroversial.54  The Pistols Act required buyers of pistols to either “produce[] a gun
or game licence then in force” or provide the seller “reasonable proof that he is a person
entitled to use or carry a gun without a gun or game licence.”55  Even this requirement,
however, did not apply if “being a householder, he proposes to use such pistol only in his
own house” or that he provide a statement that “he is about to proceed abroad for a period
of not less than six months” signed by a police officer or justice of the peace and
himself.56  Other provisions prohibited sale to any person under 18 years of age, or who
was “intoxicated or is not of sound mind.”57  And unsurprisingly, this law did not apply
in Ireland.58
The absence of laws regulating handgun ownership might be evidence that private
ownership in Britain was rare as the nineteenth century waned.  The literature of the
period, however, shows that handguns as defensive weapons were considered an
ordinary part of British life.  H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man portrays both American
visitors and Britons using pistols for self-defense, with an awareness that British lawful
use of deadly force was more restrictive than in America:
“Draw the bolts,” said the man with the black beard, “and if he comes—”  He
showed a revolver in his hand.
“That won’t do,” said the policeman; “that’s murder.”
“I know what country I’m in,” said the man with the beard.  “I’m going to let off
at his legs.  Draw the bolts.”59
In the climax of the novel, a police official asks a British civilian for a revolver with
the expectation that there is one in the house.60  Similarly, in The War of the Worlds,
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(Doubleday, Doran & Company 1933) (1917); SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure Of The Empty
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Wells describes a young lady defending herself from ruffians with a revolver she keeps
under the seat of her carriage, with no indication that this was surprising or unusual.61
Bram Stoker’s fiction also provides some idea of how late-Victorian society
regarded handguns.  The Squaw, published in the mid-1890s, depicts the relationship
between an upper class British couple on their honeymoon in Nurnberg, and “Elias P.
Hutcheson, hailing from Isthmian City, Bleeding Gulch, Maple Tree County,
Nebraska,” a figure who is portrayed as comical, but also decent, intelligent, well-
intentioned—and armed:
“I say, ma’am, you needn’t be skeered over that cat.  I go heeled, I du!”  Here he
slapped his pistol pocket at the back of his lumbar region.  “Why sooner’n have you
worried, I’ll shoot the critter, right here, an’ risk the police interferin’ with a citizen
of the United States for carryin’ arms contrairy to reg’lations!”62
Hutcheson meets a tragic end, but Stoker treats his carrying of a pistol in violation of
German law as colorful, with no more horror than we regard driving slightly over the
speed limit on the highway.
Dracula, Stoker’s most famous novel, is awash in handguns.  Unlike Elias P.
Hutcheson in The Squaw, the American Jonathan Harker in Dracula is not the only
person armed with a handgun.  Eventually, most of the vampire hunters carry them (not
for use against Dracula, but for defense against his living employees).63  Like Wells’s
novels, Stoker’s fiction expresses neither horror nor amazement at ordinary people
possessing and carrying handguns for self-defense.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories also reflect a widespread
acceptance of the possession of guns.64  While some might regard the stories as a poor
example because Holmes must occasionally deal with some rough characters due to the
nature of his occupation, it is not only the eccentric Holmes who possesses a revolver,
but also Dr. Watson.65
IV.   BOLSHEVISM AND THE FIREARMS ACT OF 1920
Despite an apparent laissez-faire attitude toward firearms in the period before
World War I, the British government was discussing handgun restrictions.  The Home
Office apparently prepared a more restrictive revision of the Pistols Act in 1911.66  The
Sidney Street Siege involving Russian anarchists that year, and the events leading up
to it, caused the Home Office to introduce a somewhat narrower measure, the Aliens
(Prevention of Crime) Bill of 1911.67  This bill sought to restrictively license carrying
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68. Id. at 33-34.
69. Id. at 31-36.
70. GREENWOOD, supra note 6, at 35 tbl.4.
71. From the beginning of the modern police department, British police officers have “relied upon the
baton and the staff as the only weapons they require.”  HILL, supra note 15, at 91.  Firearms have been
issued to elite units, or for limited periods for very specialized purposes.  Id. at 91-92.
or ownership of a handgun by aliens, but failed to get to Second Reading in the
Commons.68
The British government’s continuous upheaval during this time, followed by
World War I, seems to have stopped efforts to more tightly regulate firearms.69  Home
Secretary Edward Shortt in 1920 suggested that Parliamentary objections had also
prevented licensing of handguns before World War I.
What motivated the Home Office’s never-introduced 1911 Pistols Act, and their
continuing interest in the subject after World War I?  One possible reason was the
dramatic increase in shots fired at London police officers. 70While the total number of
officers killed, injured, or fired upon remained small, the increase from 1908 to 1912
would have seemed staggering, especially since most officers were unable to return
fire.71
Whether criminal misuse above and beyond assaults on police officers was a
reason for restrictions remains a difficult question to answer.  The accuracy of crime
statistics for this period is not high, and the deficiencies of those statistics are probably
clearer in hindsight than they were to contemporary politicians.  The statistics used by
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76. GREENWOOD, supra note 6, at 37.
77. DANGERFIELD, supra note 72, at 84-85.
78. Id. at 342-43.
various Parliamentary committees in this period are seldom part of a continuous series,
or consistently gathered, which makes meaningful analysis difficult.  Moreover,
perceptions of criminal misuse are often more important for the making of laws than
actual misuse.
Another factor that might explain the 1911 bill was the social chaos that developed
around the suffragettes, labor struggles, and the problems of Ireland.  The civility that
characterized most of the Victorian and Edwardian period in Britain was unraveling.
The suffragettes were the militant faction of the movement that sought voting
rights for women.  The suffragettes did not request votes for women, but demanded it
with a campaign of vandalism and arson intended to bully the ruling Liberal Party into
compliance.  While suffragette violence was directed entirely at objects, not people,
author George Dangerfield makes the interesting observation that in the midst of this
campaign of burning vacant buildings and smashing shop windows, “otherwise nice
old ladies began to apply for gun licenses, to the terror of their local magistracy.”72  As
discussed above, the gun licenses allowed not only the purchase but also the carrying
of guns, and there was no way to avoid issuing the license.73  This explains the judges’
“terror.”
The trade disputes led to a more serious outbreak of violence.  The 1910 coal
miners’ strike in the Rhondda Valley in Wales caused the Home Office to send 802
police officers and several regiments of soldiers to restore order—though it is not clear
how much real disorder was present when the police and army were first called.74  The
London Transport Workers’ Strike of 1911 led to more serious violence, with soldiers
fatally shooting strikers who attempted to block trains operated by strikebreakers.75
The most serious of the pre-war conflicts were related to Ireland.  It is no surprise
that Irish Nationalists engaged in armed violence in their attempts to secure
independence from Britain.  It would also be no surprise if Cabinet concerns about
Irish Nationalist access to weapons in Britain played some part in bringing about the
Firearms Act of 1920.  Ireland had long been subject to more restrictive firearms law
than Britain.76  What is surprising is how little of the secret post-war Cabinet papers
suggest a linkage between violence in Ireland and British firearms restrictions.
In addition to the problems of Irish Nationalist violence, the prospect of Home
Rule for Ireland led to another serious problem: the twin threats of Ulster Protestant
insurrection and mutiny in the army.  Sir Edward Carson led Ulster Protestants who
were determined to revolt and form their own government, rather than live under the
rule of Ireland’s Catholic majority.77
Sympathy for the Ulster Protestants ran high in the British Army.  A number of
high-ranking officers, including generals and regimental commanders, when ordered
to prepare “active operations against Ulster” in 1913 or risk “dismissal with loss of
pension” resigned their commissions.78  Interestingly enough, Bonar Law, leader of the
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opposition Conservatives, who appears to have encouraged this mutiny, was one of the
fearful members of the post-war Cabinet responsible for the Firearms Act of 1920.79
World War I quickly unified an otherwise fractured nation.  Militant suffragettes
became patriotic organizers.80  Many Irish Nationalists suspended their crusade, at least
for the first two years of the war.81  Most internal agitation ended in response to the
perceived national need and the restrictive measures of the Defence of the Realm Act.82
But as with most wars, the initial patriotic feeling did not last, and the various sources
of pre-war conflict began to reappear by 1917.
The 1916 Easter Uprising by Irish Nationalists in Dublin, and the British
Government’s execution of the leaders, created a broad-based Irish Nationalism.83
From 1917 onward, reports to the Cabinet about Ireland give evidence of high-level
concern about arms in the hands of the Irish Nationalists.84  
Secret Cabinet reports such as Field Marshall French’s July 17, 1917, The Military
Situation in Ireland acknowledged, “that the number of people openly professing Sinn
Fein principles and sympathies [is] vastly greater now than it was a year ago” and “nor
is there any satisfactory evidence that considerable quantities of Arms are not hidden
away.”85  Yet, there was no expressed interest in adding restrictions to the existing arms
laws in Britain, perhaps because the Defence of the Realm Act had given the
Government extraordinary authority to regulate firearms and ammunition for the war
effort.86
Yet by 1920, the problem of disarming the Irish Nationalists had acquired an
English connection.  A Cabinet meeting on May 31, 1920, discussed how to disarm the
Irish rebels.87  Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary of State for Ireland, explained
that it was not practical to disarm the rebels because arms were readily available in
England, and easy to smuggle into Ireland: “There is nothing to stop people bringing
arms from England because they are easily concealed.”88  
As tempting as it is to see the Irish problem as the proximate cause for the
Firearms Act of 1920, there is a chronological problem with such an explanation.  By
May 31, when Greenwood drew the connection between lax gun laws in Britain and
the Irish problem, the Firearms Act was already on its way from the House of Lords
to the Commons.89  If the hope of disarming Irish Nationalists played a part in the
Firearms Act of 1920, there is no paper trail to show a connection.  The Cabinet might
have previously had this concern, but did not put it into writing, and there is no
evidence that the Irish problems played a direct role in causing the Firearms Act of
1920.
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Another motivation for the Firearms Act of 1920 was protection of the Empire
(and that of other colonial powers) from national independence movements, as well as
fear of foreign anarchists in Britain.  In late 1918, Sir Ernley Blackwell chaired a
committee whose purpose was to 
consider the question of the control which it is desirable to exercise over the
possession, manufacture, sale, import and export of firearms and ammunition in the
United Kingdom after the war, both from the point of internal policy and having
regard to the Report of the Sub Committee on Arms Traffic of the Committee of
Imperial Defence.90
The Blackwell Committee’s report expressed concern about surplus weapons
ending up in the hands of “[s]avage or semi-civilised tribesmen in outlying parts of the
British Empire” and “[t]he anarchist or ‘intellectual’ malcontent of the great cities,
whose weapon is the bomb and the automatic pistol.  There is some force in the view
that the latter will in future prove the more dangerous of the two.”91  It would appear
that the Blackwell Committee was not concerned about non-political criminal misuse
of firearms.
To reduce the supply of arms to the “tribesmen” and “anarchists,” the committee
suggested that licensing of firearms ownership should be discretionary on the part of
the Chief Officer of Police for each district.92  Ireland, of course, was to be subject to
much stricter controls.  As a consequence of the concern about “savage or semi-
civilized tribesmen,” the British Government participated in the Paris Arms
Convention of 1919.  This was apparently a result of the Blackwell Committee’s
recommendations.93  
The Blackwell Committee’s fear of native rebellion in the Empire is not
surprising.  The spectacle of Europeans reduced to the pointless savagery of the Great
War certainly took the “advanced” Europeans down a few notches in the estimation of
their colonial “children.”  Nationalist movements grew rapidly throughout many
European empires as a result of World War I.94
Greenwood makes much of the relationship between the Blackwell Committee’s
recommendations with respect to “tribesmen in outlying parts of the Empire” and the
Firearms Act of 1920.95  At first glance, this seems an obscure relationship.  The
Blackwell Committee hoped primarily to reduce the supply of surplus military arms.
Reducing domestic sales in Britain would have been a very indirect way of disarming
rebels in Kashmir or Burma.  But the Firearms Act of 1920 included two quite separate
sections: one that restricted firearms and ammunition ownership in Britain, and another
that controlled export.  From the standpoint of the rights of Englishmen, the export
provisions are irrelevant, and will not be further addressed in this paper.
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As World War I came to a conclusion, the labor strife of the pre-war period again
reared its head, with one additional ingredient in the caustic stew: Communism.  An
August 1917 Memorandum by Professor E. V. Arnold of Bangor University was
circulated to the Cabinet at the request of Lord Milner.96  Professor Arnold warned the
Cabinet of what he termed “Labour in Revolt,” a movement of younger workers that
did not follow the trade union leaders.97  Professor Arnold described “Labour in
Revolt” as a doctrinaire revolutionary Marxist movement.98  While the words
“Communist” and “Bolshevik” never appear in Arnold’s memorandum, his language
leaves no doubt that he was describing this movement.99  Arnold also carefully
distinguished this movement from the Labour Party itself.100  
In addition to the Communist workers, an additional faction became a recurring
concern of the Government: soldiers.  In September 1917, Lord Curzon circulated to
his fellow Cabinet ministers a letter from the Bishop of Oxford entitled Alleged
Disaffection Existing Among British Troops at Home.101  The Bishop’s letter warned
that hunger, low pay, and a refusal to allow leave caused British soldiers to secretly put
up a placard “to say they were going to imitate the Russian soldiers” and that they
engaged in “open sedition in speech.”102
Late in 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia certainly added fuel to the fire
of fear in the Cabinet.  As World War I dragged to a close, conditions in Britain
created increasingly serious strikes.  The strike by the London police force on August
30, 1918 was one of the most frightening such industrial actions of the time.  Out of
a force of 19,000 policemen, 10,000 failed to show up for work.103  Lloyd George later
claimed Britain “was nearer to Bolshevism that day than at any other time since.”104
Sir Basil Thomson, Scotland Yard’s Director of Intelligence, wrote in late 1918 that
“England would be spared the full horrors of Bolshevism,” yet also believed that the
nation could be severely damaged by “serious labour disturbances, carried on with the
sympathy of the Police.”105  Thomson also believed that “serious labour disturbances”
were beyond the control of the police in big cities.106
Immediately after the war, a wave of Communist revolutionary actions took place
on the continent.107  In North America, government leaders interpreted a series of dis-
turbances and strikes as evidence of Communist subversion.108  These events created
increasing levels of fear within the Cabinet and the British intelligence service.  One
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report passed up the chain of command in early 1919 with an approving cover note
asserted:
I now find myself convinced that in England Bolschevism [sic] must be faced and
grappled with, the efforts of the International Jews of Russia combated and their
agents eliminated from the United Kingdom.  Unless some serious consideration is
given to the matter, I believe that there will be some sort of Revolution in this country
and that before 12 months are past . . . .109
The events of early 1919 seemed to confirm these fears of Communist revolution.
A general strike in Glasgow led to the raising of the red flag over city hall.110  The
Glasgow Herald called it a first step toward Bolshevism, and the Secretary of State for
Scotland called it a Bolshevik rising.111  The army was mobilized, but the police
restored order without the military’s assistance.112  In retrospect, the general strike in
Glasgow was not the first step of revolution, but it is certainly understandable that the
intelligence service, the Cabinet, and the king, misread it as such.113  
The concern about revolutionary violence appears to have motivated similar firearms
control laws in the Dominions.114  In Canada, the Winnipeg General Strike in May 1919
led to violence.115  Thomson’s January 22, 1920, Report on Revolutionary Organizations
in the United Kingdom described it as “not an industrial dispute but really an attempt to
overthrow the constitutional government and to replace it by a form of Soviet
Government planned and fashioned by the Industrial Workers of the World.116
The “alien scum” were blamed for the labor strife.117  In response, the Canadian
Parliament passed a law in 1920 requiring a permit for anyone to possess any gun.118
The Canadian Parliament repealed the permit requirement for Canadian citizens for
rifles and shotguns (though not for handguns) in 1921.119
New Zealand adopted a mandatory firearm registration law in 1920 because
returning servicemen had brought pistols and automatic weapons back to New
Zealand.120  “Revolution had occurred in Russia and there was a fear that large scale
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industrial demonstrations or even riot could occur here.”121  At least one scholar claims
that Australia’s gun control laws, adopted on a state-by-state basis during the period
between 1921 and 1932, were adopted for similar reasons.122
How should the British government respond to these fears?  There were differing
proposals within the Cabinet.  On February 27, 1919, Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones
wrote to Sir Maurice Hankey about the increasing problem of labor strife, and told how
several Cabinet ministers responded to proposals to defuse the concerns of the working
classes with social policy changes.123  These proposals drew “rather long faces” from
several Cabinet ministers, who wanted to restrict spending.124  Remarking on the
amount the ministers were willing to spend, Jones wrote, “It was blank nonsense to talk
of a bagatelle like £71,000,000—a cheap insurance against Bolshevism.”125  
Crisis after crisis increased the Cabinet’s fears of revolution.  When the Triple
Alliance of miners, railway workers, and transport workers demanded higher wages
and shorter hours in February 1919, Prime Minister Lloyd George appealed to
patriotism, asserting that the government would fall if they called a general strike: “I
feel bound to tell you that in our opinion we are at your mercy.  The Army is
disaffected and cannot be relied upon . . . .  In these circumstances, if you carry out
your threat and strike, then you will defeat us.”126
Throughout 1919, fear of revolution rose and fell, depending on the events of the
moment, but the undercurrent of fear never went away.127  The Cabinet’s Strike
Committee responded to a railroad strike on September 26, 1919, with orders to the
army to secure railroads and power stations against sabotage.128  The Committee also
concluded that a “Citizen Guard” was now necessary to deal with the danger of a
general strike.129  Though the Cabinet abandoned the Citizen Guard plans when the
railroad strike was settled on October 5, 1919,130 this proposal—and the fears it
represented—reappeared in 1920.131  Perhaps indicative of the Cabinet’s belief in the
power of armed civilians, the British government reacted with anger at a 1920 plan by
the Soviet government to impose a “civic militia” of armed Polish workers on defeated
Poland, for the apparent purpose of bringing about a Communist coup.132
As 1920 opened, the Cabinet’s fear of Communist revolution was again on the
rise.  The January 7, 1920, report The Labour Situation from the Ministry of Labour
warns of a leftist newspaper that “announces an attempt is to be made within the next
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few months to overthrow democratic government and to set up some form of ‘Soviet’
rule, by means of a ‘general strike,’ and anticipates that this strike will be accompanied
by an upheaval in Ireland.”133
The workers were also described as increasingly unwilling to listen to labor union
leaders,134 with the more radical labor newspapers distinguishing between “reactionary
Trade Union officials” and radical parts of “political Labour.”135  Director of
Intelligence Thomson’s January 9, 1920, Report of Revolutionary Organisations in the
United Kingdom warned that while miners were losing faith in the strike as a tool for
achieving their ends, “There is abundant evidence that the great mass of Labour is
drifting steadily to the Left.”136  Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter of
January 17, 1920, to Jones discusses a Cabinet meeting about the industrial situation:
C.I.G.S. [Chief of the Imperial General Staff] also is positively in a state of dreadful
nerves on the subject.  Churchill is the only one who is sane on this subject . . . .
From a meeting yesterday evening I came away with my head fairly reeling.  I felt I
had been in Bedlam.  Red revolution and blood and war at home and abroad!137
While many of Thomson’s intelligence reports seem to fit into the concern about
Communist revolution, others suggest that he did not consider this a likely occurrence
—unlike the Cabinet ministers.  Thomson’s January 22, 1920, Report on Revolutionary
Organisations in the United Kingdom acknowledged that reports were circulating in
London “that a revolution is to be expected within the next two months.”138  But
Thomson’s report also insisted “the minority that would like to see a sudden and
violent revolution is ridiculously small.”139  Instead, his concern was about “[t]he flow
of Bolshevik propaganda, which is very ably written, will inevitably be greatly
increased when trade is opened with Russia.”140  Thomson proposed new legislation
instead to deal with such propaganda; he worried more about the pen than the sword.141
A worrisome issue raised in Thompson’s January 9, 1920, Report on Revolution-
ary Organisations in the United Kingdom was unemployment among recently
demobilized soldiers, “which is driving many of the more moderately-minded ex-
Service men into the revolutionary camp.”142  The demobilization and reduction of war
production produced a rapid increase in unemployment in 1919, only somewhat
alleviated in 1920.143
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Thomson’s January 9, 1920, report also warns of the growth of the National Union
of Ex-Service Men.  The National Union was a radical faction of discontented veterans
that was developing ties to more mainstream veterans’ organizations, as well as to
officials of the Police Union.144  The goal of the National Union, in the words of its
national secretary, was to form “Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Workers’ Councils with a view
to taking over the means of production, distribution and exchange and thereby freeing
the workers from wage slavery and exploitation.”145  Thomson’s January 22, 1920,
Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom also warned of the
close ties between the National Union, the Labour Party, and a supposed “Red Army”
being organized in Reading by an “Ex-Lieutenant Nicholson.”146
Why was there such concern about veterans?  We can deduce from Secret Cabinet
reports that some of the concern stemmed from the weakness of the military.  Sir Henry
Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, issued a report titled Capacity of the Army
to Assist the Civil Power in Industrial Disturbances.147  The report warned in its
somewhat ungrammatical cover memorandum, “[T]he whole question of the use to be
made of the Army in any future internal trouble gives grave cause for anxiety.  Not
only will the Army be . . . far too weak to give the full measure of assistance to the
police necessitated by disturbances on a large scale.”148
After warning that the Army lacked the capacity to guard its own facilities without
assistance from the civil authorities, Wilson also cautioned, “If it is called upon at an
early stage to assist the Civil Authorities, it will be dispersed, and thus the last reserve
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in the hands of the Government will be dissipated.”149  Wilson believed that at least
40,000 troops would be needed to restore order in an emergency.150  By March, the
British Army in Great Britain would be reduced to 25,000, many of them “young
soldiers with little training, insufficient military discipline, very short of good and
reliable non-commissioned officers.”151  Most troubling of all to Wilson was that
40,000 troops assumed “an adequate police force is in existence,” an assumption that
he specifically denied.152
From the covering memorandum on Wilson’s report, it is clear that the problem
of insufficient troops to restore order had been a concern of the Cabinet since at least
November 18, 1919.153  In early January 1920, Sir Eric Geddes, Chairman of the
Cabinet’s Supply and Transport Committee, gave an even more frightened description
of the inability of police and army to protect the Government:
The Minister of Labour has reported that there is a possibility of a revolutionary
outbreak in Glasgow, Liverpool, or London in the early spring, when a definite
attempt may be made to seize the reins of Government.  In normal circumstances the
chances of success of such an attempt would probably be small, but the danger would,
in my opinion, be serious if the attempt were made when the country’s resources had
already been taxed by the strain of a great industrial crisis, such as a strike of coal
miners.  It is not inconceivable that a dramatic and successful coup d’etat in some
large centre of population might win the support of the unthinking mass of labour,
exasperated as the latter is by the increasing cost and difficulty of living.154
The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries’ January 26, 1920, memorandum
Industrial Disturbances echoed this concern: “[T]he revolutionaries in this country
have been pushing their propaganda, unhindered and unanswered, and perfecting their
arrangements for a trial of strength in March or April.”155  
The concerns about the disaffected veterans are now more understandable.  A
weak army of raw recruits might be successful against unarmed workers with no
combat experience, but raw recruits might well break under fire from determined
combat veterans.
To reinforce a weak and perhaps untrustworthy police force and army, Cabinet
ministers had previously proposed a “citizen guard” of politically reliable men to fight
against a Bolshevik revolution.156  Thomas Jones’s notes from the February 2, 1920
conference tell us that “[d]uring the discussion Bonar Law so often referred to the
stockbrokers as a loyal and fighting class until one felt that potential battalions of
stockbrokers were to be found in every town.”157  
76 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1
158. MEMORANDUM BY SIR E. TROUP, Jan. 17, 1920, PRO. CAB. 24/96/312-14. 
159. Id. at 313.
160. 1 JONES, supra note 13, at 98.
161. Id. at 99.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 103.
Instead of the “Citizen Guard,” Permanent Home Secretary Sir Edward Troup
proposed on January 17, 1920, to create a temporary volunteer force of demobilized
soldiers to back up the police.158  He hoped that it would be possible to filter out those
who might fight on the side of the insurgents.159
More evidence of the Cabinet’s fears can be found in Sir Maurice Hankey’s
January 17, 1920, letter to Thomas Jones in which he describes the strategy he
suggested to Prime Minister Lloyd George:
1. Make absolutely sure of your arms and munitions.
2. Prepare the cadres of your future organisation.
3. If and when trouble arises, you have only to hold up your little finger to get as
many men as you require to ensure security.  That is the moment to form your
permanent organisation.160
It appears that while Jones and Hankey believed that the risk of revolution was
greatly exaggerated, many Cabinet ministers believed an attempt at armed revolution
was imminent.161  Jones’s notes for the February 2, 1920, meeting about industrial
unrest report that Lloyd George “played the rôle of taking the revolution very
seriously.”162  Jones seemed to think that while George regarded the concern as
overblown, he was reluctant to say so to his ministers.163 
At the same meeting, an exchange between Prime Minister Lloyd George and his
Cabinet ministers shows the level of fear that drove the government.  This fear of
revolution was the only stated reason for restrictive firearms licensing in the classified
documents or memoirs that predates introduction of the Bill in Parliament:
The P.M. ‘You won’t get sabotage at the beginning of the strike.’
Roberts.  ‘You will have to take sabotage at the beginning of the strike into account.
There are large groups preparing for Soviet government.’
Eric Geddes.  ‘You have got to reckon on the electric power stations being put out of
order.’
. . . .
Macready.  ‘On our information we do not run to the revolution yet.  If there is an
outbreak of strikes and if there is a sufficient force available, civil or military, to stop
it at once, it will fizzle out.  We were told today that 700 rifles were concealed in
Liverpool.  Supposing sabotage and violence get ahead it is very difficult to say how
far they will go.  We are taking private steps to secure the aid of a certain class of
citizen.’
. . . .
 Long.  ‘The peaceable manpower of the country is without arms.  I have not a pistol
less than 200 years old.  A Bill is needed for licensing persons to bear arms.  This has
been useful in Ireland because the authorities know who were possessed of arms.’
Shortt.  ‘The Home Office has a Bill ready but in the past there have always been
objections.’
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Bonar Law.  ‘All weapons ought to be available for distribution to the friends of the
Government.’164
There is no “smoking gun” to establish that this discussion on February 2, 1920,
led to the introduction of the Firearms Act in the House of Lords less than two months
later on March 31.165  Nonetheless, Home Secretary Shortt’s assertion before the House
of Commons on June 8 that the bill was to disarm “criminals or weak-minded persons
and those who should not have firearms”166 seems ingenuous, at best.
Significantly, the manner in which the bill was brought to a vote in the Commons
suggests that the Government did not want the bill carefully examined:
After its first reading in the Commons on June 1, 1920, it was scheduled for a second
reading and full debate the following day.  This was cancelled.  Then, at 10:40 on the
evening of June 8, the bill was brought back without warning and with two other bills
scheduled for consideration in the few minutes remaining before adjournment.  Only
a handful of those members present were given copies of the text.167
M.P. Hogge complained, “I have only looked at the Bill within the last 10 minutes.”168
This attempt to ram the bill through led to vigorous objection, not only to the bill on
its own merits, but also to the attempt to sneak it past the Commons.169  
One opponent pointed to the long history of the right to keep and bear arms in
Britain.170  No one argued that firearms in private hands were needed for personal
protection.  M.P. Kiley complained that if the goal was to disarm burglars, the Firearms
Act would not be effective, since burglars would “burgle a place where they are kept
in stock, and he could then get them in a wholesale way.”171  Kiley went on to suggest
that if Shortt’s claimed purpose for the law was to disarm criminals, the bill should be
limited to that purpose.172  In Kiley’s view, “the Bill goes far beyond things of that
kind.”173 
Hogge complained that such discretion in license issuance would be applied in a
discriminatory manner based on class.174  While acknowledging that the conditions of
Ireland might justify such action, he and other members of the House of Commons
expressed concern if such discretion were allowed in Britain.175  Kiley went further.
Based on his experience with Home Secretary Shortt, and his several predecessors
during the war, he said:
I regret any further powers being left to the present Home Secretary, because my
experience of him has been that he has always taken the strictly legal view, and
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anything in the nature of a sympathetic view of his duties has been entirely absent.
For that reason I am unwilling to leave anything more to the right hon. Gentleman’s
unfettered discretion.176
One of the most interesting objections was from M.P. Lieutenant-Commander
Kenworthy.  His argument was based on the Whig view of history that arms in private
hands acted as a restraint on abuses by the government:
In the past one of the most jealously guarded rights of the English was that of carrying
arms.  For long our people fought with great tenacity for the right of carrying the
weapon of the day, the sword, and it was only in quite recent times that that was given
up.  It has been a well-known object of the Central Government in this country to
deprive people of their weapons.177
After discussing Henry VII’s attempt at disarming the great nobles, Kenworthy
pointedly warned that disarming the population would not be an effective way of
breaking popular control:
I do not know whether this Bill is aimed at any such goal as that but, if so, I would
point out to the right hon. Gentleman that if he deprives private citizens in this
country of every sort of weapon they could possibly use, he will not have deprived
them of their power, because the great weapon of democracy to-day is not the halberd
or the sword or firearms, but the power of withholding their labour.  I am sure that the
power of withholding his labour is one of which certain Members of our Executive
would very much like to deprive him.178
The Earl of Winterton responded that Kenworthy
holds the most extraordinary theories of constitutional history and law.  His idea is
that the State is an aggressive body, which is endeavoring to deprive the private
individual of the weapons which Heaven has given into his hands to fight against the
State . . . .  Holding those views, and believing that it is desirable or legitimate or
justifiable for private individuals to arm themselves, with, as far as I understand his
remarks, the ultimate intention of using their arms against the forces of the State, he
objects to this Bill.  There are other people who hold those views in this country, and
it is because of the existence of people of that type that the Government has
introduced this Bill . . . .179 
 Winterton thus stated directly a reason for the bill’s introduction that was in line with
what Shortt had said in the secrecy of a cabinet meeting,180 but which was contrary to
Shortt’s representations to Parliament.181  
In the ensuing exchange, Kenworthy reiterated that “the very foundation of the
liberty of the subject in this country is that he can, if driven to do so, resist . . . .  You
can only govern with the consent of the people.”182  Winterton responded, “I say it is
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intolerable that, at this time, such a doctrine should be preached in this House . . . .”183
When Kenworthy, a liberal, asked Winterton, a conservative, about the Ulster
Volunteers, who had threatened rebellion before the war with the encouragement of the
Conservative Cabinet minister Bonar Law who was now a part of the Cabinet that
sought this law, Winterton refused to answer the question.184
Winterton also insisted, “Before the War, the majority of the people in this country
had almost forgotten that there were such things as firearms. . . .”185  Our examination
of the popular literature from the pre-war period suggests otherwise.186
The bill passed by a vote of 254 to 6.187  What significance is there in such a
lopsided vote?  First of all, Kenworthy was not simply a traditional English gentleman,
preserving obsolete liberties for their own sake.  Thomson’s January 22, 1920, “Report
on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom” devoted an entire heading and
paragraph to Kenworthy:
The member for Hull has been very active in his own district during the recess.  He
has addressed many meetings and has been busy amongst the seafaring population,
to whom he has promised his support for an 8 hour day.  Under his influence the Hull
Junior Liberal meetings have become practically socialist.  He is anxious to obtain a
passport for Moscow.188
This would suggest that Kenworthy’s interest in widespread arms ownership was not
entirely academic.  It might also explain why the vote was so lopsided in the House of
Commons, where we would expect Kenworthy’s views to have been at least as well
known as they were to the Director of Intelligence.
What other evidence is there that would tell us something of the purpose of the
Firearms Act of 1920?  The Firearms Act licensed handguns and rifles.189  Concealable
firearms have been the weapon of choice for criminals for a very long time, simply
because they provide an element of surprise.  The pre-war laws regulating the purchase
and carrying of firearms applied only to handguns for that reason.  
If the Firearms Act of 1920 had licensed only handguns, Shortt’s claims before the
Commons would be at least superficially plausible.  If the Firearms Act of 1920 had
included all firearms, it might be argued that it had been drafted in an overly broad
manner in an attempt to disarm criminals.  However, the inclusion of rifles (but not
shotguns) in this licensing measure suggests that the fear of Bolshevik revolution
expressed throughout more than two years of Cabinet discussions and reports was what
really drove this bill.  In a revolutionary struggle against soldiers, a shotgun’s value is
limited because its range is limited.  Soldiers armed with rifles can engage an insurgent
force armed with shotguns at a distance of 100 to 150 yards with no fear of serious
injury, even if the insurgents outnumber the soldiers by a significant margin.  Soldiers
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confronting revolutionaries with rifles, however, would be at serious risk of injury or
death, depending on the number or marksmanship of the revolutionaries.
Furthermore, the concern about radicalized veterans that play such a prominent
part in secret reports throughout 1919 and 1920 is easy to understand as part of the fear
of revolution.  Contrary to the myth of the Minuteman in the American Revolution,
armed civilians have seldom played a significant effective part in any war against an
organized military.  The major deficiency of armed civilians is partly a shortage of
modern weapons of mass destruction, partly a matter of training, and partly the
psychologically toughening experience of combat itself.190  
The Cabinet imagined that there were large numbers of radicalized veterans of
World War I.191  Had this been the case, they would have had the training and combat
experience to make them a serious fighting force, especially since, by the admission
of General Wilson, much of the British Army in England at that time consisted largely
of recent recruits without combat experience.  
V.   THE PROXIMATE CAUSE IDENTIFIED
The evidence is clear that the proximate cause of the Firearms Act of 1920 was a
fear of revolution.  The Cabinet believed a revolution might enjoy sufficient popular
support to actually overthrow the lawful government.  Home Secretary Shortt’s
statements to the Commons about disarming criminals, while a plausible explanation
for the licensing of handguns, are not supported by Jones’s diary or the secret Cabinet
papers.  There is no written evidence to substantiate Cabinet concerns about ordinary
crime,192 but enormous evidence that the Cabinet believed a violent political revolution
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was imminent in which the police and military would be outnumbered by combat
veterans.  The functional analysis of the Firearms Act is consistent with this fear of
revolution, rather than a fear of non-political crime.
Based on what the Cabinet believed might happen, the decision to restrictively
license rifles in the interests of self-preservation made perfect sense.  It is, however,
hardly a proud moment, for it suggests the Cabinet believed the masses were so
opposed to the Government that large numbers of them were ready to rise up—and the
Government was prepared to deny even a “true, ancient and indubitable right”193 of
Englishmen in order to preserve a system of government that had lost much of its
legitimacy in the pointless and brutal bloodshed of World War I.
